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Abstract: Directive 93/13/EEC requires any court which hears an action for annulment
of an arbitration award to determine whether the arbitration agreement is void and to
annul the award if it finds that that arbitration agreement contains an unfair term to the
consumer’s detriment, where this issue is raised in the action for annulment but was not
raised by the consumer in the arbitration proceedings. This ruling is based on an analogy
with the Eco Swiss judgment and on the public interest of the protecting the consumer, in
view of the risk that of the latter being is unaware of his rights or of encountering diffi-
culties in enforcing them. These grounds as well as the questionable finding that the
Directive amounts to Community public policy, are subjected to critical review in this
paper, following theCofidis case – the latter being the second occasion on which a national
procedural rule had to yield to the principle of effectiveness. The most striking feature of
this judgment is the contrast between the Court’s far-reaching intervention in the
domestic procedural legal order, at the expense of the principle of procedural autonomy
on the one hand, and its will to leave the assessment of what constitutes an unfair term to
the discretion of the national courts on the other. If the Court has its way, the harmonisa-
tion of the protection against unfair contract terms will be procedural rather than sub-
stantive by nature.
Re´sume´: La directive 93/13/CEE implique qu’une juridiction nationale saisie d’un
recours en annulation d’une sentence arbitrale appre´cie la nullite´ de la convention
d’arbitrage et annule cette sentence au motif que ladite convention contient une clause
abusive, alors meˆme que le consommateur a invoque´ cette nullite´ non pas dans le cadre de
la proce´dure arbitrale, mais uniquement dans celui du recours en annulation. Cette
de´cision est fonde´e sur une analogie avec l’arreˆt Eco Swiss et sur l’inte´reˆt public de la
protection du consommateur, eu e´gard au risque que celui-ci soit dans l’ignorance de ses
droits ou rencontre des difficulte´s pour les exercer. Ces fondements ainsi que la recon-
naissance douteuse du caracte`re d’ordre public communautaire de la directive sont sou-
mis a` une e´valuation critique. Apre`s l’affaire Cofidis, la Cour fait une seconde fois plier
une re`gle de proce´dure nationale devant l’effet utile de la directive. L’aspect le plus
frappant de cet arreˆt est le contraste entre l’immixtion dans l’ordre proce´dural interne,
au prix du principe de l’autonomie proce´durale, et sa volonte´ de laisser la de´finition de ce
qui constitue une clause abusive a` la discre´tion du juge national. S’il en tient a` la Cour,
l’harmonisation de la protection contre les clauses abusives sera celle des proce´dures
nationales plutoˆt qu’une harmonisation sur le plan du contenu de la directive.
Zusammenfassung: Richtlinie 93/13/EWG impliziert, daß ein nationales Gericht, das
u¨ber eine Klage auf Aufhebung eines Schiedsspruchs zu entscheiden hat, die Nichtigkeit
der Schiedsvereinbarung pru¨ft und den Schiedsspruch aufhebt, wenn die Schiedsverein-
barung eine missbra¨uchliche Klausel zu Lasten des Verbrauchers entha¨lt, auch wenn der
Verbraucher diese Nichtigkeit nicht im Schiedsverfahren, sondern erst im Verfahren der
Aufhebungsklage eingewandt hat. Dieses Urteil stu¨tzt sich auf eine Analogie mit der Eco
Swiss Entscheidung und auf das o¨ffentliche Interesse am Verbraucherschutz angesichts
der Gefahr, daß der Verbraucher seine Rechte nicht kennt oder Schwierigkeiten hat, sie
auszuu¨ben. Diese Gru¨nde und die anfechtbare Folgerung, daß die Richtlinie Teil der
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gemeinschaftlichen o¨ffentlichen Ordnung ist, werden kritisch besprochen. Nach dem
Cofidis Fall, ordnet der Gerichtshof zum zweiten Mal eine nationale Verfahrensvorschrift
dem Effektivita¨tsprinzip unter. Das Auffallendste an diesem Urteil ist der Kontrast
zwischen der weitreichenden Einmischung in die nationale Verfahrensordnung auf Kos-
ten der nationalen Verfahrensautonomie und der Wille, die Definition einer mißbra¨u-
chlichen Klausel dem nationalen Richter zu u¨berlassen. Wenn es nach dem Europa¨ischer
Gerichtshof geht, betrifft die Harmonisierung des Schutzes vormißbra¨uchlichen Klauseln
eher den Verfahrensverlauf als den Inhalt der Richtlinie.
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Dutch case note
CHARLOTTE M.D.S. PAVILLON*
1. The Facts1
In May 2002 a contract was concluded between a consumer, Ms Mostaza Claro (claim-
ant) and a mobile telephone operator Mo´vil (defendant). This contract contained an
arbitration clause for the resolution of disputes. The European Association of Arbitra-
tion in Law and in Equity (AEADE) was to be addressed for the arbitration of any
disputes arising from the contract. Ms Mostaza Claro did not observe the minimum
subscription period, and as a consequence Mo´vil brought arbitration proceedings
before the AEADE. Ms Mostaza Claro was granted a period of ten days in which to
refuse arbitration proceedings but did not avail herself of this offer. She chose instead
to present arguments on the merits of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal found against
her. Ms Mostaza Claro then applied to the referring court, contesting the arbitration
decision and claiming that the arbitration agreement was null and void because of the
unfair nature of the arbitration clause. The Audiencia Provincial de Madrid confirmed
the unfair nature of this clause. However, under Spanish procedural law Ms Mostaza
Claro should have pleaded that the agreement was invalid during the arbitration pro-
ceedings. Seeking to interpret national law in conformity with the Unfair Contract
Terms Directive,2 the Spanish court requested the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC, referring the following question:
May the protection of consumers under Council Directive 93/13/EEC require
the court hearing an action for annulment of an arbitration award to determine
whether the arbitration agreement is void and to annul the award if it finds that
that arbitration agreement contains an unfair term to the consumer’s detri-
ment, when that issue is raised in the action for annulment but was not raised
by the consumer in the arbitration proceedings?
2. A Critical Review of the ECJ’s Reasoning in this Decision
TheECJ answered the referredquestion affirmatively. This reply owes a great deal to the
application of syllogistic reasoning, since the ECJ draws its conclusion from two
* LL.M. MA, Doctorate candidate at the Department of Private and Notarial Law, University of
Groningen, Netherlands. I am greatly indebted to Professor Mark Wissink for reading and providing
valuable comments on this article. This article is an adapted version of a Dutch case note written for
the Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 2007/4, pp 149–157.
1 ECJ 26 October 2006, Case C-168-05 Mostaza Claro v. Centro Mo´vil Milenium SL [2006] ECR
I-10421.
2 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95/
29) hereinafter referred to as the Directive, as Directive 93/13, or as the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive.
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premises.The firstpremiseorstatementwouldbethe ruling in theEcoSwiss judgment.3
The second premise is the (implicit) statement that the Directive contains such man-
datory Community rules of public policy because of ‘the nature and importance of the
public interest underlying the protection which the Directive confers on consumers’.4
2.1 First Premise: The Analogy with the Eco Swiss Ruling
The preliminary question inMostaza Claro resembles that which led to the Eco Swiss
ruling. In both cases, a national court hearing an action for annulment of an arbi-
tration award inquired whether it should annul the award if, in its view, it violated
Community law.Whereas in the Eco Swiss case the arbitration award failed to comply
with mandatory provisions of EC competition law, in Mostaza Claro the arbitration
procedure was based on an unfair contract term within the meaning of Directive 93/
13. In Eco Swiss the ECJ ruled that,
where its domestic rules of procedure require a national court to grant an
application for annulment of an arbitration award where such an application
is founded on failure to observe national rules of public policy, it must also
grant such an application where it is founded on failure to comply with Com-
munity rules of this type [author’s emphasis].5
Mandatory provisions of EC competition law were, from that point onwards, to be
considered as Community rules of public policy in the legal context of the review and
annulment of arbitration awards. At the same time, the ECJ set a precedent, in that
henceforth the abovementioned ruling should also apply in full to any arbitration
awards based on an unfair arbitration clause (i.e. agreement). The provisions of the
Directive (on which the protection system is based) were to be regarded as rules of
Community public policy.6
This reasoning by analogy presents two flaws.7 The first lies in the omission of
what, in my opinion, constitutes the most valid argument put forward in the Eco
3 ECJ 1 June 1999, Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055.
4 ECJ C-168/05, para. 38.
5 ECJ C-168/05, para. 35.
6 ECJ C-168/05, para. 35.
7 Yet, the ECJ was right to leave out the nullity sanction argument underpinning the public policy
nature of Art. 81 EC in the Eco Swiss ruling. Art. 6 (1) of Directive 93/13 cannot be confirmed to be
equipped with this sanction. This article is to be read as a mere reference to national law. Otherwise,
this omission would have been justified as the nullity sanction constitutes a poor argument in favour
of the fundamental nature of a rule of EC law: S. PRECHAL and N. SHELKOPLYAS, ‘National
Procedures, Public Policy and EC Law. From Van Schijndel to Eco Swiss and beyond’, ERPL
(European Review of Private Law) 5-2004, p. 589, at pp 605–606: ‘Does (the unique express nullity
sanction attached to Art. 81) imply that other rules lacking such a sanction will not qualify as
fundamental ( . . . )? The criterion of nullity used by the ECJ shed little light on the differentiation
of rules within EC competition law’.
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Swiss judgment. The ECJ ignored the valid proposition that arbitrators should not be
allowed to make preliminary referrals to the ECJ, since this could adversely affect the
uniform interpretation of Community provisions. The argument that European rules
and their underlying values may not be subverted in arbitration proceedings could
have strengthened the analogy and provided more solid grounds for the conclusion
that national arbitration law had to take second place.
The second flaw resides in the intrinsic weakness of the only argument that was
actually derived from the Eco Swiss case, i.e. that the public policy nature of the
directive could be based on Article 3 EC Treaty. Directive 93/13 ‘is, according to
Article 3(1)(t) EC, a measure which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks
entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal
market’.8 This basis for attributing public policy status to Community rules has
already been called into question with respect to the Eco Swiss judgment.9 How
persuasive is the argument that rules adopted for one type of the activities of the
Community listed in Article 3 should be awarded public status? All EC consumer law
directives on consumer law could, by that token, potentially be regarded as rules of
economic public policy. This lack of clarity is unfortunate not only in view of the
different ways in which the public policy nature of a rule can be conceived in various
domestic and international contexts, but also because of the unidentifiable and
eclectic status of Community public policy, which is concerned either with meta-
economic policy or with economic policy in a general sense.10 The boundaries of
what constitutes Community economic public policy remain largely undefined. More
certainty is needed as public policy in a national context is often at odds with its
counterpart at the Community level. On the one hand, public policy exceptions which
are based on the protection of national interests and concerns may constitute an
obstacle to achieving the fundamental economic objectives of the Community. On
the other hand, Community economic public policy can be regarded as a threat to
fundamental national values.11 It could be argued that, by analogy with the Rutili
ruling12 and in view of the principle of procedural autonomy, the way in which the
ECJ interprets the notion of Community economic public policy should be a
restrictive one.
8 ECJ C-168/05, para. 37.
9 S. PRECHAL and N. SHELKOPLYAS, op. cit. in footnote 7, at 605.
10 The first type of public policy comprises competition law and monetary stability, the second type
forms a warrant for fundamental rights and safety: S. PRECHAL and N. SHELKOPLYAS, op. cit. in
footnote 7, pp 600–602.
11 F. TERRE´, P. SIMLER and Y. LEQUETTE, Droit civil – Les obligations, Dalloz, Paris 2005, n 374.
12 ECJ 28 October 1975, Case C-36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, para. 27: ‘( . . . ) the concept of public
policy must, in the community context and where, in particular, it is used as a justification for
derogating from the fundamental principles of equality of treatment and freedom of movement for
workers, be interpreted strictly ( . . . )’
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In this respect, the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Tizzano deserves
particular attention. Mr Tizzano advocated that the public policy status of the
provisions contained in this Directive provisions be substantiated in a cautious
and detailed manner, based on ‘fair trial’ considerations.13 He was somewhat
reluctant to follow the ‘path proposed by the Commission’, i.e. that which passes
through the tasks entrusted to the Community in Article 3(1)(t) EC Treaty, as he
‘fear(s) that (this view) is open to the objection that it might give excessively wide
scope to (the public policy) concept’ (a highly pertinent remark that remained
largely unheeded). Instead of this approach – which he nevertheless describes as
being possibly ‘legitimate’ – Mr Tizzano proposes a strategy inspired by the second
type of Community public policy referred to above, i.e. that which is based
on fundamental rights and safety measures.14 In his view, the ‘fundamental
principle of the legal order, namely the right to a fair hearing’ is at the centre
of this case. The prudent approach proposed by the Advocate General represents a
sound and convincing alternative to the reasoning by analogy which is based on
Article 3 EC.
2.2 Second Premise: The Public Importance of the Directive Protection System
The ECJ devotes many paragraphs to the importance of external corrective action
by national judges aimed at securing the effectiveness of the protection provided
by the Directive.15 In these grounds of judgment the ECJ continually refers to its
earlier readings of Directive 93/13 as establishing a system of protection against
the risk that a consumer could be unaware of his rights or experience difficulties in
enforcing them. The imbalance between the weak consumer on the one hand and
the seller or supplier on the other, in terms of both their respective bargaining
power and their level of knowledge, can, according to the ECJ, only be corrected
through positive action by national judges who have no connection with the actual
parties to the contract. In its Oce´ano ruling,16 the ECJ used the penalty attached to
Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 to give the national courts the authority to deter-
mine, independently, whether or not a term is unfair. This article seeks to prevent
that the consumer be bound by an unfair contract term.17 The Oce´ano ruling was
subsequently confirmed by the Cofidis judgment.18 According to the ECJ, the
13 Opinion Advocate General Tizzano, paras 56–57. See also: N. REICH, ‘More clarity after ‘‘Claro’’?’,
ECLR (European Contract Law Review) 2007-1, p. 41, at 42–43.
14 He refers to: ECJ 28 March 2000, Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935.
15 ECJ C-168/05, paras 25 to 31 and 36 to 38.
16 ECJ 27 June 2000, Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Oce´ano Grupo [2000] ECR I-4941.
17 ‘Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a
seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and
that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in
existence without the unfair terms.’
18 ECJ 21 November 2002, Case C-473/00 Cofidis [2002] ECR I-10875.
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nature and importance of the public interest upon which the protection contained
in Directive 93/13 is founded is such that its provisions should be regarded as
rules of European public policy.19 However, the Court fails to specify why the
protection provided by Directive 93/13 is significant in terms of economic public
policy. Accordingly, as has been mentioned before, its conclusion is lacking in a
sound basis.
3. Far-Reaching Intervention in the National Procedural Legal Order
3.1 The Respective Roles of the ECJ and National Courts Regarding
Procedural Rules
The choice of specific procedural rules seeking to safeguard individual rights derived
from Community law is left to the domestic legal order of each Member State,
provided that account it taken of the Rewe conditions.20 In accordance with the
principle of equivalence, national procedural rules designed to ensure the protection
of the rights which individuals acquire under Community law may not be less favour-
able than those governing similar domestic rights. Also, in the light of the effective-
ness principle, they may not make it impossible in practice, or excessively difficult, to
exercise those rights which are conferred by the Community legal order. The frame-
work within which Member States may determine the judicial and procedural rules
governing the remedies for enforcing individual European rights has become settled
case law.21
The requirements of effectiveness (or effective judicial protection22) and
equivalence do not automatically mean that procedural provision should yield to
Community law. As the ECJ stated in Van Schijndel:
Each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision
renders application of Community law impossible or excessively difficult must
be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its
progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national
instances. In the light of that analysis the basic principles of the domestic
19 It remains unclear whether the public policy nature relates to either the entireDirective or only to Art.
6 (1): the analogy with theEco Swiss ruling suggests the first option, the referrals to theOce´ano ruling
specifically point at Art. 6 (1) of the Directive.
20 ECJ 16 December 1976, Case C-33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989.
21 ECJ 16 May 2000, Case C-78/98 Preston and Others [2000] ECR I-3201, para. 31; 19 September
2006, Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany and Arcor [2006] ECR I-8559, para. 57;
15March 2007, Case C-35/05Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH v.Ministero delle Finanze [2007]
n.y.r., para. 40.
22 The expanded version of the principle of effectiveness was developed for the first time in ECJ 15 May
1986, Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651. See S. PRECHAL and N. SHELKOPLYAS, op. cit. in
footnote 7, p. 591.
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judicial system, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of
legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate,
be taken into consideration.23
This analysis of the domestic situation on a case by case basis provides a justification
for the procedural autonomy of the Member States as it prevents the unimpeded
application of Community law. As such it is tantamount to a procedural rule of
reason.24 The ECJ must give due attention to the entire factual and legal context
of each case. In theVan Schijndel ruling, this ‘custom-made’ analysis made it possible
to give precedence to the Dutch principle of judicial passivity, which was ultimately
justified by the rule of reason:
That principle reflects conceptions prevailing in most of the Member States as
to the relations between the State and the individual; it safeguards the rights of
the defence; and it ensures proper conduct of proceedings by, in particular,
protecting them from the delays inherent in examination of new pleas.25
3.2 The Procedural Rule of Reason (Twice) and the Unfair
Contract Terms Directive
The Mostaza Claro ruling is characterized by far-reaching intervention in the
national procedural legal order on the part of the ECJ. In the field of administrative
law, such intervention in the national procedural in the name of the principle of
effectiveness is a not uncommon occurrence. However in the field of consumer
law, national procedural autonomy has been tampered with less frequently. Directive
93/13 constitutes an exception: the principle of effectiveness had already been
applied twice (three times if we take the Oce´ano ruling into account)26 and in
both the Cofidis and Mostaza Claro cases national procedural law had to make
way for the effective application of the Directive. In Cofidis effective judicial protec-
tion, as inferred from the Directive, precluded the application of a national provision
which prevented the national court from finding a term unfair (either ex officio or
following a plea raised by the consumer) after the expiry of a limitation period. What
23 ECJ 14 December 1995, Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel [1995] ECR I-4705,
para. 19.
24 J.W. RUTGERS, ‘Ambtshalve toepassing van Europees recht in het civiele geding’, in: R.J.C. Flach et.
al. (eds), Rutgers-bundel, Kluwer, Deventer 2005, p. 295–303, at pp 296–297, with reference to ECJ
C-430/93 and C-431/93, para. 19 and ECJ 14 December 1995, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995]
ECR I-4599, para. 14.
25 ECJ C-430/93 and C-431/93, para. 21.
26 In all three cases the ECJ reached a result with considerable implications for national civil procedural
law by interpreting the Directive in the light of the expanded version of the principle of effectiveness,
i.e. the principle of effective judicial protection. However, unlike the Cofidis and Mostaza Claro
judgments, the Oce´ano ruling did not subject a conflicting national procedural rule to this principle.
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does the application of the rule of reason test tell us about the motives for these two
intrusions into national procedures?
In its Cofidis ruling, the Court at least expressively noted the requirement that
an assessment be made ‘on a case by case basis’.27 Yet, both the Cofidis and the
Mostaza Claro ruling barely take account of the ‘case’s own factual and legal context
as a whole’, passing over the procedural rule of reason.28 InMostaza Claro, the actual
interest inherent in efficient arbitration proceedings was not properly taken into
consideration.29 From this point of view, the fact that the old Spanish procedural
rule was overridden is questionable. The fact that Spanish procedural law ‘no longer
requires an objection to the arbitration, in particular on the grounds of the invalidity
of the arbitration agreement, to be raised at the same time as the parties make their
original claims’ might have removed the need for a procedural rule of reason test.30
The Court’s ruling in both cases is based exclusively on an extraordinary – or even
excessive – emphasis placed on protecting the weaker party.31
InMostaza Claro, however, the ECJ seems to make some kind of reservation,
as it did in Eco Swiss earlier. In the knowledge that national judges are merely
required to interpret national law in conformity with the Directive as far as possi-
ble,32 the ECJ actually takes account of the restrictions imposed by national law. A
national court must grant an application for annulment based on a failure to comply
with Community rules of public policy ‘where ( . . . ) domestic rules of procedure
require (it) to grant an application for annulment ( . . . ) founded on failure to observe
national rules of public policy’ [author’s emphasis].33 Does this mean the continued
application of a national rule which requires an objection to the arbitration, in
particular on one which is based on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement, to
be raised at the same time as the parties make their original claims? Whereas such a
rule no longer exists in Spanish law,34 it remains applicable in counties such as the
Netherlands (Article 1052(2) in conjunction with Article 1065(2) Dutch Code of
Civil Procedure). Dutch rules of procedure do not allow a court to grant an applica-
tion for annulment of an arbitration award when the arbitration clause constitutes an
unfair term and its nullity was not raised in time. If he found himself in Ms Mostaza
Claro’s situation, a Dutch consumer would not enjoy the same level of protection.
27 ECJ C-473/00, para. 37.
28 After Cofidis the lack of consideration for the national rule was severely criticised: C. NOURISSAT,
‘Droit communautaire et forclusion biennale: l’e´trange effet utile de l’esprit de la directive ‘‘clauses
abusives’’!’, Dalloz 2003, pp 486–490.
29 ECJ C-168/05, paras. 33–34.
30 ECJ C-168/05, paras. 32.
31 See the Oce´ano ruling but also ECJ 9 November 2000, Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v. Eaton
Leonard Technologies Inc. [2000] ECR I-9305; J.W. RUTGERS, op. cit. in footnote 24, p. 299.
32 ECJ 13 November 1990, Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135.
33 ECJ C-168/05, para. 35.
34 ECJ C-168/05, para. 32.
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The concerns about the possible constraints exercised at national level make little
sense in the light of the ‘categorical imperative’ relating to protection which was
advanced in the ECJ’s decisions on Directive 93/13. The principle of (judicial) effec-
tiveness would probably obstruct many of those constraints.
4. Directive 93/13 Equating Community Public Policy?
4.1 Public Policy Nature: For What Purposes?
Like Eco Swiss, the Mostaza Claro judgment illustrates the application of the Rewe
principles governing the relationships between EC law and the national procedural
environment in the context of arbitration. Whilst at first glance the result of the
application of those principles in Mostaza Claro occurs within the same limited
context, the actual implications of this application might reach a little further.
There are several indications that the protection organised by the Directive consti-
tutes an element of Community public policy for a broader purpose than the annul-
ment of arbitral awards. The repeated referrals to the Oce´ano and Cofidis judgments
raise the question whether the public policy status of the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive can be ‘generalized and extrapolated’ to cover the area of the ex officio
application of the Directive.35
For a start, the application of the Rewe principles within the framework of
Directive 93/13 already concerns the ex officio application of the Directive (e.g. in
Cofidis). Even though the ECJ never mentioned the public policy nature of the
Directive in relation to the special powers conferred upon the national court
aimed at achieving the goals set by Articles 6 and 7, Advocate General Saggio did
describe the provisions of the Directive as ‘ ‘‘mandatory’’ rules of ‘‘economic public
policy’’ ’ in his Opinion on the Oce´ano case.36
Second, a shift can be detected with regard to the compulsory nature of the
unfairness test. From theMostaza Claro ruling there clearly emerges a duty to decide
ex officio on the unfairness of a contract term, thus closing the debate on the question
whether courts have a mere power or a full duty to assess this unfairness of its own
motion. In comparison to theOce´ano ruling,Mostaza Claro noticeably tightened the
judicial assignmentunderArticle 6of theDirective. From thenational court ‘beingable
to determine of its own motion whether a term of a contract before it is unfair’,37 it is
according to the Mostaza Claro ruling ‘being required to evaluate of its own motion
whether a contractual term is unfair, compensating in this way for the imbalance which
exists between the consumer and the seller or supplier’ [author’s emphasis].38Not only
35 S. PRECHAL and N. SHELKOPLYAS, op. cit. in footnote 7, p. 599. The preliminary question of the
Spanish court does not touch the issue of the ex officio application of the Directive as Ms Mostaza
Claro actually pleaded that the term was unfair in the action for annulment.
36 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Oce´ano, para. 25.
37 ECJ C-240/98, para. 29.
38 ECJ C-168/05, para. 38.
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do the national courts need to have the power to assess the unfairness of a term of their
own motion; they are actually obliged to make use of their powers.
Third, the arguments underlying the public interest of the protection bene-
fiting the potentially weak consumer, i.e. a system that aims at compensating the risk
that a consumer is unaware of his rights or experiences difficulties in enforcing them,
are formulated in such abstract and general terms that the extrapolation of the public
policy nature of this system might be justified. It looks as if the ECJ is introducing an
abstract image of the consumer in the field of unfair contract terms as it had previ-
ously done in the area of misleading advertising.39 Each time a consumer might be
unaware of his rights or experiencing difficulties in enforcing them, the Directive
would amount to public policy.
4.2 Putting the Public Policy Nature of Directive 93/13 Into Perspective
Even though the Dutch unfairness test does not constitute public policy, the Dutch
courts should apply Community public policy rules as they do national public policy
rules.40 Regarding theunfairness test, a problemarises. TheCommunity public policy
rule in question is not directly applicable and the consistent interpretation technique
has its limits:41 the sanction for failing the test underDutch law, theavoidabilityof the
term, isnot designed tobeappliedby a judgeof its ownmotionandneeds tobe raisedby
the parties.42 That being said, there is great similarity between the duty to consider ex
officio the unfairness of a contract term imposed by the ECJ and the obligation of a
national court under Dutch procedural law to add of its ownmotion legal grounds not
put forward by parties (Article 25DutchCode of Civil Procedure).With regard to non-
public policy rules, this obligation only applies as long as the limits of the dispute are
taken into consideration. This means the court cannot rely on facts and circumstances
other than those advanced by parties (Article 24Dutch Code of Civil Procedure). This
passive role of the judge, left unaffected in the Van Schijndel ruling,43 is however to
39 The ECJ’s typical consumer in the field of unfair contract terms seemingly diverges from the ‘rea-
sonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’ consumer who serves as reference
in the free movement-case law. See e.g. ECJ 16 July 1998, Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide [1998]
ECR I-4657.
40 J.W. RUTGERS, op. cit. in footnote 24, p. 302.
41 ECJ C-106/89.
42 The inadequacy of the current provision asks for its amendment: C.E. DRION, ‘Een pamflet voor het
fundamenteel op de schop nemen van onze regelgeving over algemene voorwaarden’, Contracteren
2007/1, p. 2, at 3.
43 ECJ C-430/93 and C-431/93, para. 22. After applying the procedural rule of reason test, the Court
decided that ‘Community law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion an issue
concerning the breach of provisions of Community law where examination of that issue would oblige
them to abandon the passive role assigned to them by going beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by
the parties themselves and relying on facts and circumstances other than those onwhich the party with
an interest in application of those provisions bases his claim’.
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becomemore active when the rule appearing in the case before him is of public policy.
In that case the judge would be less bound by the limits of the dispute: the facts and
circumstances advanced by the parties would not be the only basis on which the judge
can decide of the unfairness of the term. The judge could for example rely to a larger
extent on information contained in the case files to assess the unfairness of the term of
its own initiative.
After the Eco Swiss ruling there was little ambiguity about the fact the ruling
had no implications for the Dutch principle of judicial passivity: there was no duty to
consider an infringement of competition law ex officio. Even afterOce´ano, the ruling
in Van Schijndel still drew the limits of the Dutch judicial activism with regard to EC-
law. The combined public policy character of the provisions of the Directive and duty
of the national judge to consider unfairness of its own motion might imply that we
cannot longer take Van Schijndel and other rulings where the procedural rule of
reason prevailed for granted when it comes to the field of unfair contract terms. If
the public policy nature of the Directive indeed is broader that that of Article 81 EC in
Eco Swiss, the ECJ opened a way to bypass the Van Schijndel judgment in the field of
unfair contract terms. Yet, this conclusion needs to be put into perspective: the
additional information to the service of the judge will most of the time not be suffi-
cient to draw final conclusions and supplementing the legal grounds with a public
policy rule will often require the cooperation of the parties.44
5. A ‘Procedural’ Rather Than Substantive Harmonisation
The ECJ has a clear vision of how it wishes to contribute to the harmonisation of the
protection against unfair contract terms. On the one hand, if procedural rules form
the slightest hindrance to the effective working of the Directive – and this seems to be
easily the case – it will attach little value to the procedural autonomy of Member
States. On the other hand it leaves the application of the substantive unfairness test at
the discretion of the national courts. The Mostaza Claro judgment confirms this
contrasted approach to harmonisation. First, the precedence offered once again to
the protection of the potentially weak, ‘ignorant’ and/or ‘impecunious’ consumer
stresses the growing importance of this idea at the expense of the procedural rule of
reason. Second, although the preliminary question does not deal with the unfairness
test as such, the ECJ finds the opportunity to endorse the recent Hofstetter ruling, in
which it defined the limits of its interpretative competences regarding the substance
of the unfairness clause.45
44 H.B. KRANS, H.H.B. VEDDER and M.H. WISSINK, ‘Ambtshalve toetsing van overeenkomsten aan
het kartelverbod’, VrA (Vermogensrechtelijke Annotaties) 2005/1, p. 5, at 22–27.
45 A possible reason why the ECJ goes into this competence question is because the parties which
submitted written observations did spend a significant amount of time considering the question
whether the arbitration clause at issue in the main proceedings really constituted an unfair term.
See the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Oce´ano, para. 23.
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The ECJ appears to have been correct in setting those limits, since it is only
entitled to interpret the content of an EC provision and may not apply its interpretation
to the factsof thecase.Yet it isdifficult tomakearigorousdistinctionbetweenapplication
and interpretation.With regard to theunfairness test (Article 3 of theDirective), theECJ
has struggled with this distinction. In the Oce´ano case, the ECJ practically declared a
jurisdiction clause unfair as it ‘was solely to the benefit of the trader and contained no
benefit in return for the consumer’. Even though the circumstances were allegedly obvi-
ous, theECJ took them into account and applied the test. In theHofstetter case, however,
the ECJ considered the circumstances were less evident than in Oce´ano and left the
application of the test to the national court. The question is not so much what ‘evident
circumstances’ actually amount tobutwhether theECJhas distanced itself from its active
Oce´ano approach (and ever will consider circumstances as plain again).Mostaza Claro
indicates this is the case: in its ruling the ECJ reiterated it was not allowed to rule on the
application of the general criteria laid down in Directive 93/13 to a particular term.
This however should not mean that there will be no common interpretation of
the unfairness test.46 Interpreting a general clause without applying it to the concrete
circumstances is possible. The ECJ could construe the content of the minimum
unfairness clause in terms of perspectives, standards and criteria national law should
at least include, without delving into the facts – a task the ECJ is aware of but seem-
ingly could not fulfil in Hofstetter.47 Even if there is a strong case for the focus on
procedural law ‘as it may undermine protection intended by substantive law’,48 there
are still many questions that need be answered with regard to the interpretation of the
Article 3 Directive good faith and significant imbalance concepts (and their internal
relationship). Answers could be given provided questions are formulated in a more
abstract way and the ECJ holds less restrictive views on its interpretative task.49 Its
reticence strikingly contrast with the active interpretative role the ECJ traditionally
ascribed itself in shaping the internal market.50 Because of its significance for the free
movement provisions, the open-textured misleading clause51 has often been given a
46 Divergent opinions on the procedural or substantive nature of the good faith concept prove the need
for such an interpretation.
47 Case C-237/02 Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3403, para. 22.
48 See, in relation to the effect of the concept of burden of proof on the unfairness test: F. BRUDER,
‘Burden of Proof and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive’, ERPL 2007/2, pp 205–
231.
49 E.g. G. ALPA, ‘AGlance at Unfair Terms in Italy and the United Kingdom (What an Italian Lawyer can
Learn from the English Experience)’, EBLR (European Business Law Review) 2004, p. 1123, at
1128–1129, or H.-W. MICKLITZ, ‘House of Lords – Fair Trading v. National Bank’ (Case Note),
ERCL 2006/4, p. 471, at 479–480.
50 Directive 93/13 is based on Art. 95 EC and ‘ha(s) as (its) object the establishment and functioning of
the internal market’.
51 Notably as referred to in Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250/17).
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European interpretation.52 In this respect, the ECJ’s restrictive views on its inter-
pretative role as regards Directive 93/13 might unveil its opinion on the internal
market aim of the Directive53 and maybe even on the feasibility of substantive
contract law harmonisation. That’s for the future to show.
52 Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-667; Case C-238/89, Pall [1990] ECR I-4827;
Case C-126/91, Yves Rocher [1993] ECR I-2361; Case C-456/93, Langguth [1995] ECR I-1737;
and Case C-470/93,Mars [1995] ECR I-1923. This interpretation was regularly applied to the facts at
hand. By doing so, the ECJ itself contributed to blur the distinction between application and inter-
pretation: P. CRAIG and G. DE BU`RCA, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, Oxford University
Press 2003, pp 472–473.
53 P. NEBBIA, Unfair Contract Terms in European Law – A Study in Comparative and EC Law, Hart
Publishing 2007, p. 171.
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